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Equity in the Marketplace:  
Reviewing the Use of  
Unconscionability to Restrain  
Calls on Performance Bonds
TANG HANG WU*
I. Introduction
In describing the role of equitable jurisprudence in the market place with its 
emphasis on open-ended concepts like conscience, Lord Millett famously observed 
in an extrajudicial essay that:
Even twenty years ago there was still a widely held belief, by no means confined to 
common lawyers, that equity had no place in the world of commerce. Businessmen 
need speed and certainty; these do not permit a detailed and leisurely examination 
of the parties’ conduct. Commerce needs the kind of bright line rules which the com-
mon law provides and which equity abhors. Resistance to the intrusion of equity into 
the business world is justified by concern for the certainty and security of commercial 
transactions.1
Writing in relation to fiduciary law, Lord Millett dismissed the anti-equity 
 sentiment in the first sentence of his essay by stating that: ‘Equity’s place in 
the law of commerce, long resisted by commercial lawyers, can no longer be 
denied’.2
This tension, described by Lord Millett, between bright line rules which  promote 
certainty in commercial dealings as compared to equitable jurisprudence based 
on a detailed examination of parties’ conduct is played out acutely in the debate 
* I am grateful to James Penner, Dora Neo, Robert Stevens, Paul S Davies, Kelry Loi, Lau Kwan Ho 
and the participants of the survey for their help. The usual caveats apply.
1 PJ Millett, ‘Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce’ (1998) 114 LQR 214, 214.
2 ibid.
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3  United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL).
4 GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd & Anor [1999] 3 SLR(R) 44.
5 The developments are traced in L Hsu, ‘Autonomy of Performance Bonds in Singapore’ (1992) 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 297; A Loke, ‘Injunctions and Performance Bonds—
A Return to English Orthodoxy’ (1995) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 682; L Hsu, ‘Performance 
Bonds in Singapore: An Update’ (1996) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 35; A Wong, 
‘Restraining a Call on a Performance Bond—Should “Fraud or Unconscionability” be the New 
Orthodoxy?’ (2000) 12 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 132; Q Loh and HW Tang, ‘Injunctions 
Restraining Calls on Performance Bonds—Is Fraud the Only Ground in Singapore?’ [2000] Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 353.
6 There is some evidence that the unconscionability exception jurisprudence has taken root in 
Malaysia. See Sumatec Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v Malaysian Refining Company Sdn Bhd 
[2012] 4 MLJ 1.
7 See Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1985 Rev Ed) s 5, which provides questions and issues with respect 
to mercantile law generally shall be the same as that which would be administered in England. This 
section was repealed in 1993. See A Phang, ‘Reception of English Law in Singapore: Problems and 
Proposed Solutions’ (1990) 2 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 20.
8 Seng Djit Hin v Nagurdas Purshotumdas & Co [1923] AC 444 (PC).
on the role of unconscionability in restraining performance bonds. English law 
which subscribes to the philosophy of promoting certainty in relation to perfor-
mance bonds restrains a call on performance bonds on the very limited basis of 
fraud.3 This is because English law subscribes to the principle that a performance 
bond, like a letter of credit, should be considered to be autonomous from the 
underlying contract between the parties. Or to put it in another way, a perfor-
mance bond is treated as cash in hand and the beneficiary of the bond should be 
allowed to avail himself or herself of the bond. In contrast, Singapore’s jurispru-
dence on performance bonds is noteworthy because it represents a conscious and 
significant departure from English law. The Singapore Court of Appeal confirmed 
in GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd & Anor4 after a period 
of some uncertainty5 that unconscionability is a separate and distinct ground 
from fraud to restrain a call on performance bonds. This has resulted in a robust 
debate found in the banking literature on whether this development in Singapore 
is  desirable and should be adopted by other jurisdictions.6
This conscious divergence from English law may be seen as a major develop-
ment in the history of Singapore’s commercial law. With regard to contract and 
commercial law, Singapore has always endeavoured to mirror English law. True 
to its status as an international commercial hub, Singapore has since its earliest 
days sought to retain the purest form of English commercial law.7 As Voules J 
explained in Seng Djit Hin v Nagurdas Purshotumdas & Co,8 this pragmatic policy 
was ‘to inspire confidence amongst merchants by assuring them that any ques-
tions arising in regard to their commercial transactions will be decided in the like 
case at the corresponding period in England’. Although the formal reception of 
English commercial law was discontinued in 1993, English contract and commer-
cial decisions are still today invariably cited by counsel in court, often accepted as 
persuasive and routinely applied by the Singapore courts. In other words, while 
English decisions are not binding in a stare decisis sense on the Singapore courts, 
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9 Although in recent times the Singapore courts are increasingly developing their own jurispru-
dence. See S Menon, ‘The Somewhat Uncommon Law of Commerce’ (2014) 26 Singapore Academy 
of Law Journal 23 which traces the development of Singapore’s jurisprudence on implied terms in 
contract.
10 eg the Singapore Court of Appeal refused to follow the English approach as found in The Achilleas 
[2008] UKHL 48, [2009] 1 AC 61 (HL) on remoteness in contractual damages. See Out of the Box Pte 
Ltd v Wanin Industries Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 363; noted Y Goh, ‘Contractual Remoteness in England 
and Singapore Compared: Orthodoxy Preferable?’ (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law 233.
11 GHL Pte Ltd (n 4).
they are nevertheless regarded as highly persuasive authority.9 Hence, this diver-
gence from English law on the law on performance bonds heralds a new age where 
 Singapore judges are increasingly confident of developing their own jurispru-
dence in  commercial law.10
At the start, it is important to set out what this chapter does not purport to do. 
The present author resists the temptation to seek to demonstrate which position 
is the better approach to performance bonds, ie, English or Singapore law. It is 
suggested that there is no way to reach a firm conclusion one way or the other. This 
is because the arguments for each position are well known and firmly entrenched. 
In favour of the English position of a bright line rule that the courts may not 
intervene save for fraud is that this promotes certainty in relation to performance 
bonds. As opposed to an emphasis on the value of certainty, the Singapore courts 
adopt a fact-sensitive approach to protect the obligor of a performance bond from 
abusive calls on performance bonds. The obvious drawback to the Singapore juris-
prudence on performance bonds is the lack of certainty as to when the courts 
would intervene. But that is the price to pay for adopting a fact-sensitive test 
to protect the weaker contracting party in the relationship. However, this is not 
to say that the English position is perfect and wholly free from criticism. In order to 
achieve the bright line rule of certainty, the English position is essentially a blunt 
tool. English law is only capable of dealing with fraudulent calls on performance 
bonds; it is unable to deal with the problem of abusive calls on performance bonds 
which does not reach the threshold of fraud. Viewed in this context, it is not pos-
sible, in my view, to say that one position is ‘better’ than the other position. Rather, 
the divergence in the law represents a conscious policy choice which each jurisdic-
tion has adopted to achieve a particular goal.
Instead of embarking on an inconclusive enquiry as to which is the better 
approach, this chapter surveys every single reported and unreported Singapore 
decision at every level since GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd & 
Anor11 where a call on a performance bond was challenged on the ground of 
unconscionability. Hence, this review provides a case study as to how uncon-
scionability operates as a legal doctrine on the ground. Further, most academic 
work has tended to focus on decisions by the High Court and Court of Appeal 
while ignoring the unreported decisions in the District Court. By surveying 
and  analysing the District Court’s decisions, it is hoped that this chapter would 
 provide a more accurate insight as to how unconscionability is applied. On a more 
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12 eg P Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 Western Australia 
Law Review 1.
granular level, there are several aims to this survey of the cases. First, a survey of 
these cases will show, to a certain extent, the number of challenges that have been 
brought to court. This will then either confirm or refute the fear that the adop-
tion of the ground of unconscionability would result in an intolerable floodgate 
of applications before the court. Second, the survey of cases will seek to determine 
the percentage of successful restraints and the grounds on which unconscionabil-
ity has been made out. Thus, the analysis of the cases will essentially map out the 
ambit of unconscionability in the context of performance bonds. Third, a study 
of the cases will also reveal that some contracting parties have begun to choose 
foreign law to govern the performance bond or exclude unconscionability as a 
distinct ground for restraint from the terms of the performance bond. This is an 
interesting development because it provides some evidence that when the law is 
uncertain, sophisticated parties with a stronger bargaining power may draft their 
contracts to exclude these uncertain default rules.
A well-known criticism of the use of unconscionability as a legal doctrine in the 
market place is that it is too uncertain and prevents practising lawyers from advis-
ing their clients properly.12 Essentially, this argument is an empirical assertion. In 
order to assess this argument in the context of performance bonds, a survey of 
leading practitioners in the construction industry in Singapore was undertaken 
to ascertain their views and practices in relation to performance bonds. More 
specifically, questions as to their clients’ contracting behaviour were posed to 
these lawyers. Other questions included whether they have experienced calls on 
performance bonds which were tactical and abusive, whether their clients were 
concerned with performance bonds being restrained on the ground of uncon-
scionability and whether they were frequently asked by their clients to restrain 
performance bonds. The survey also delved into the number of hearing days such 
applications would take and the legal costs involved. In this survey, the lawyers 
were also asked whether they thought the law was certain enough for them to 
advise their clients and whether they thought that unconscionability in this con-
text was a positive or negative development. The results of their responses will 
demonstrate how practising lawyers in Singapore cope with the uncertainty inher-
ent in the law of unconscionability in relation to performance bonds. An enquiry 
about the choice of foreign law to govern performance bonds and clauses which 
exclude unconscionability was also pursued in this survey.
The data from the survey of the cases and practitioners’ responses may prove 
useful to any jurisdiction which is confronted with the policy choice of whether to 
adopt a separate ground of unconscionability with regard to restraints on perfor-
mance bonds. Ultimately, the overarching theme which emerges from this chapter 
is that while unconscionability is undoubtedly a fact-sensitive enquiry and not 
capable of being stated in the form of bright line rules, it can still operate in this 
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13 G Wooler, ‘The New “Asplenium Clause”—Unconscionability Unwound’ [2016] Singapore Jour-
nal of Legal Studies 169, 179.
14 See GHL Pte Ltd (n 4); JBE Properties Pte Ltd v Gammon Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 47; BS Mount Sophia 
Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd [2012] 3 SLR 352.
15 eg LP Thean, The 12th Singapore Law Review Lecture: ‘The Enforcement of A Performance Bond: 
The Perspective of the Underlying Contract’ (1998) 19 Singapore Law Review 389; A Lee, ‘Injuncting 
Calls on Performance Bonds: Reconstructing Unconscionability’ (2003) 15 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 30.
16 An argument made by C Debattista, ‘Performance Bonds and Letters of Credit: A Cracked Mirror 
Image’ (1997) 7 Journal of Business Law 289, 304.
17 GHL Pte Ltd (n 4).
18 JBE Properties Pte Ltd (n 14) [10].
field where commercial certainty is said to be of paramount importance. The 
 survey of the practitioners’ responses also indicated that more sophisticated par-
ties who have the bargaining power are now contractually excluding unconscion-
ability from the terms of the performance bond. If this trend continues, this may 
spell the demise of the unconscionability exception to calls on performance bonds. 
As a commentator recently noted, the unconscionability exception may ‘possibly 
[be] rendered moot by the power of private law and the freedom to contract’.13
II. Unconscionability as a Ground for Relief:  
Rationale, Doctrinal Underpinnings  
and Standard of Proof
The policy rationale for adopting unconscionability as a separate ground to 
restrain performance bonds as compared to the more stringent standard of fraud 
which is the sole ground for restraint for letters of credit has been traversed exten-
sively in the Singapore cases14 and academic literature.15 Essentially, there are two 
main explanations for this. First, the Singapore judges have pointed out that the 
apparent symmetry between letters of credit and performance bonds is flawed.16 
LP Thean JA makes the point in GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte 
Ltd & Anor17 that
it should not be forgotten that a performance bond is basically a security for the perfor-
mance of the main contract, and as such we see no reason, in principle, why it is should 
be so sacrosanct and inviolate as not to be subject to the court’s intervention except on 
the ground of fraud.
Chan Sek Keong JA reiterated this point in JBE Properties Pte Ltd v Gammon Pte 
Ltd:
[A] performance bond is merely security for the secondary obligation of the obligor to 
pay damages if it breaches its primary contractual obligations to the beneficiary. A per-
formance bond is not the lifeblood of commerce, whether generally or in the context of 
the construction industry specifically.18
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19 GHL Pte Ltd (n 4).
20 BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd (n 14) [27].
21 Loh and Tang (n 5).
22 BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd (n 14).
23 ibid [31].
24 The history of the rule against penalties was traced recently in Cavendish Square Holding BV 
v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 (HL).
Second, the recognition of the unconscionability exception was to counter abusive 
calls on performance bonds. In GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte 
Ltd & Anor,19 LP Thean JA observed that a performance bond may operate as an 
oppressive instrument if it is misused. The Court of Appeal in BS Mount Sophia 
Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd20 accepted the observation by commentators who argue 
‘[i]n certain cases, it is not unforeseeable that an abusive call may effectively crip-
ple the principal financially … An abusive call may render the principal insolvent 
or incapable financially to proceed to arbitration or litigation’.21
However, it would be a mistake to think that the Singapore courts approach the 
issue of restraining a performance bond lightly. The judges are acutely aware of the 
arguments against the unconscionability exception. Andrew Phang JA described 
this area as posing a ‘perennial tension’ in BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd v Join-Aim 
Pte Ltd22 and acknowledged that liquidity concerns would also affect the bene-
ficiary of the bond. In other words, ‘the deprivation of the beneficiary’s right to 
call on the performance bond could equally well be as detrimental to its liquidity’ 
(emphasis in the original). Due to this ‘perennial tension’, the learned judge said 
a balance needs to be struck and as such, Phang JA said that ‘the actual grant of 
such  injunctions should be kept within a very narrow compass’ (emphasis in the 
original).23
While the Singapore judges have articulated the policy reasons, they have thus far 
not explained the doctrinal basis for the unconscionability exception. This point is 
important because it would impact on the issue of whether the unconscionability 
exception may be contractually excluded by the parties. There are several compet-
ing possibilities to justify the doctrinal underpinning for the unconscionability 
exception. First, the unconscionability exception may be justified as an extension 
of equity’s rule against penalties and relief against forfeiture. Second, the doctrinal 
basis is premised on the notion of inequality of bargaining power between the 
parties. Finally, the unconscionability exception in relation to performance bonds 
is truly a new doctrine created by the judges as a response to the policy reasons 
given above.
It is interesting to note that penalty rule developed from the equitable juris-
prudence to provide relief against defeasible penal bonds.24 Such penal bonds are 
promises to pay a certain sum of money subject to the satisfaction of a condition, 
for example, the performance of a primary obligation. In other words, once the 
obligation is performed, the penal bonds cease to be payable. While it is tempt-
ing to equate the unconscionability exception with equity’s rule against penalties 
and relief against forfeiture, there is a major difference between these doctrines. 
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25 See Cargill International SA and Another v Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corporation 
[1998] 1 WLR 461 (CA). Such relationships are not uncommon in other banking contexts. See S Booy-
sen, ‘“Pay Now—Argue Later”: Conclusive Evidence Clauses in Commercial Loan Contracts’ (2014) 
1 Journal of Business Law 31.
26 GHL Pte Ltd (n 4).
27 Dauphin v The Private Office of HRH Sheik Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zahed Nahyan [2000] 1 SLR(R) 
117 [57].
28 BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd (n 14) [24].
29 Eltraco International Pte Ltd v CGH Development Pte Ltd [2000] 3 SLR(R) 198.
30 BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd (n 14).
In relation to penalties and forfeiture of monies, the claimant invokes equity’s 
jurisdiction to prevent a defendant from keeping the entire sum of money. 
However, the unconscionability exception with respect to performance bonds is 
merely a temporary restraint on the fund. If it can be demonstrated after the dis-
pute resolution process between the parties that the damages are indeed far less 
than the sum called on the performance bond, the defendant must account to 
the  claimant.25 Thus, it could be argued that the rule against penalties and relief 
against forfeiture deals with a more draconian situation whereby the defendant 
is attempting to keep the monies regardless of his or her damages. It is therefore 
understandable that the law would be more hesitant in letting parties contract out 
of these rules.
The second possible doctrinal explanation for the unconscionability doctrine 
need not detain us for too long. Like other parts of the Commonwealth, Singapore 
does not have a free-standing doctrine of inequality of bargaining power. Thus, 
the most persuasive account of the unconscionability exception in this context is 
that it is a new doctrine in the face of pressing policy considerations. Indeed, this 
explanation is consistent with the case law as the judges have not been concerned 
to look at similar doctrines in developing the unconscionability exception.
Initially, there was some confusion as to the standard of proof required to estab-
lish unconscionability. Thean JA had said in GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Con-
struction Pte Ltd & Anor26 that ‘where there is prima facie evidence of fraud or 
unconscionability, the court should step in to intervene’. However, the Court of 
Appeal subsequently clarified in Dauphin v The Private Office of HRH Sheik Sultan 
bin Khalifa bin Zahed Nahyan27 that the standard of proof required was a strong 
prima facie case of unconscionability. The reason for requiring a high threshold 
for unconscionability has been rationalised as ‘the need to strike the appropri-
ate balance between the conflicting positions of the obligor and beneficiary of 
a performance bond’.28 It is also important to note that the Singapore courts do 
not approach a restraint on the ground of unconscionability from an ‘all or noth-
ing’ perspective. In Eltraco International Pte Ltd v CGH Development Pte Ltd,29 the 
Court of Appeal ordered a partial restraint of the bond after examining the facts 
of the case.
Arguably, a further gloss to the standard of proof was added in BS Mount 
Sophia Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd.30 Justice Phang after affirming the strong prima 
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31 ibid [21]. The distinction between unconscionability and fraud will be dealt with in section V 
below.
32 N Enonchong, The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] Lloyd’s Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 83, 104 and N Enonchong, The Independence Principle of Letters of 
Credit and Demand Guarantees (Oxford, OUP, 2011) para 7.34.
33 A Malek and D Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits (London, Tottel Publishing, 2009) para 9.30.
34 Enonchong, The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ (n 32) 105 and Enonchong, 
The Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees (n 32) para 7.35.
35 D Horowitz, Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees: Defences to Payment (Oxford, OUP, 
2010) 169.
facie case of unconscionability test emphatically said ‘[w]e must emphasise that 
the courts’ discretion to grant such injunctions must be sparingly exercised and 
it should not be an easy thing for an applicant to establish a strong prima facie 
case’.31 It is anticipated that these words would have an impact on the future 
success rate of injunctions to restrain performance bonds.
III. Negative Academic Reactions to  
Unconscionability and the Singapore Court  
of Appeal’s Response
Generally, overseas academic reactions to the Singaporean jurisprudence on 
unconscionability and performance bonds have been largely negative. The first 
objection to unconscionability as a separate ground for restraining a performance 
bond is that such an additional ground would erode the integrity of performance 
bonds which are treated as equivalent to cash. As Professor Nelson Enonchong 
writes: ‘that easy availability of injunctions would destroy confidence in [perfor-
mance] bonds as the equivalent of cash in hand and undermine their utility as the 
lifeblood of commerce’.32 In a similar vein the learned editors of Jack: Documentary 
Credits state that such an exception ‘would tend to reduce confidence in the system 
of credits’.33 Second, detractors of unconscionability point out that this exception 
will lead the court to become entangled in the underlying contractual dispute. 
Enonchong argues that the ‘recognition of the unconscionability exception may 
lead to the courts getting involved in disputes arising from the underlying contract 
when such disputes should be resolved in separate proceedings and in accordance 
with any arbitration or jurisdiction clause in the underlying contract’.34 Horowitz 
pursues this theme as well in her monograph by contending that the unconsciona-
bility exception forces the court to probe too deeply into circumstances surround-
ing performance of the underlying contract.35 Third, commentators point out 
that unconscionability as a ground for restraint is imprecise, vague and difficult 
to define. It is argued that accepting unconscionability as a ground for restraining 
performance bonds would inject intolerable uncertainty in an area where clarity 
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36 Enonchong, ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ (n 32) 105 and Enonchong, 
The Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees (n 32) para 7.33; see also Malek 
and Quest (n 33) para 9.30.
37 P Ellinger and D Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credits (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2010) 325–26.
38 JBE Properties Pte Ltd (n 14) [10].
39 BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd (n 14).
40 JBE Properties Pte Ltd (n 14) [11].
41 ibid [33].
42 K Loi, ‘Two Decades of Restraining Unconscionable Calls on Performance Guarantees—From 
Royal Design to JBE Properties’ (2011) 23 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 504, 508–09.
and certainty are highly prized.36 Finally, Horowitz argues that many of the Singa-
pore cases decided on unconscionability may be determined in a similar fashion 
based on the fraud exception. She argues that these cases may be restrained on the 
ground of fraud because the beneficiary had ‘no honest belief ’ that the beneficiary 
was entitled to call on the performance bond. Horowitz’s point will be considered 
in the section on the survey of cases.
Two well-known Singapore banking scholars, Peter Ellinger and Dora Neo, have 
also expressed scepticism about the unconscionability exception. They argue that 
an independent guarantee serves the function where the beneficiary ‘can be paid 
first and talk later’.37 Ellinger and Neo also point out that the beneficiary may have 
sacrificed a stronger position by not insisting on retention money and accepting a 
bond. In these circumstances, they argue that the autonomy principle is as equally 
important in performance bonds as in a letter of credit.
Interestingly, the Singapore Court of Appeal responded to these academic cri-
tiques on two occasions in JBE Properties Pte Ltd v Gammon Pte Ltd38 and BS 
Mount Sophia Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd.39 Chan Sek Keong CJ disagreed with 
Ellinger’s and Neo’s argument that the autonomy principle should apply with 
equal force to a performance bond. The Chief Justice thought that if parties had 
agreed to the provision of a performance bond instead of cash, the parties must 
have accepted the risk that a call on the performance bond might be restrained. 
According to Chan CJ, the fact that performance bonds may be restrained ‘is a 
factor which the employer-beneficiary must be taken to have considered and 
accepted in preferring a performance bond to a cash deposit’.40 In relation to the 
point of the potential ease of obtaining an injunction, Andrew Phang JA in BS 
Mount Sophia Pte Ltd accepted that this was a valid concern. The key considera-
tion according to Justice Phang is that unconscionability must be applied in a 
nuanced manner and applied ‘in a principled manner, having regard to the facts of 
the case at hand’ (emphasis in original).41 However, the learned judge repudiated 
the assertion that it was easy to obtain an injunction based on unconscionability. 
In this regard, Phang JA cited Kelry Loi’s work where Loi pointed out that such an 
injunction may only be obtained where there is unconscionable behaviour and it 
is provable on strong evidence.42 The learned judge also responded to the argu-
ment that the recognition of unconscionability would lead the court to getting 
involved in disputes arising from the underlying contract. Again, the Court cited 
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43 ibid 510–511.
44 BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd (n 14) [35].
45 cf JBE Properties Pte Ltd (n 14) [15] where the terms of the performance bond expressly stipulate 
that the exceptions to payment is fraud or unconscionability.
46 GHL Pte Ltd (n 4).
Loi, who argues that the autonomy principle has already been comprised by the 
fraud  principle. Loi says rhetorically that ‘the courts will … not allow the law or 
its offices to become instruments of unconscionable conduct’.43 With regard to 
the point that the concept of unconscionability is too vague, Phang JA thought 
that this was a far too pessimistic view. The learned judge said that while crisp 
definitions of legal doctrines are generally preferable, ‘we do not think that relief 
for unconscionable conduct should be categorically rejected simply because a neat 
and tidy definition of the same is not forthcoming’.44 Thus, while Phang JA alluded 
to general principles associated with the unconscionability exception, it would 
seem that the jurisprudence in this area is to be decided incrementally with refer-
ence to a multi-factorial approach. This multi-factorial approach will be explored 
below.
IV. Contracting Out of Unconscionability:  
Choosing Foreign Law and Excluding  
Unconscionability
Predictably, it was a matter of time before a contracting party with the stronger 
bargaining power sought to mitigate the uncertainty surrounding the concept of 
unconscionability by attempting to contract out of unconscionability.45 However, 
the option of contracting out of unconscionability raises its own potential uncer-
tainty. Would the court respect such clauses? Or more fundamentally, are parties 
able to agree amongst themselves to contract out of unconscionable behaviour? 
Prima facie, it seems counterintuitive that parties may agree that one party may 
act in an unconscionable behaviour in a contractual setting. The inherent uncer-
tainty associated with such clauses may explain the reason why they only surfaced 
in the reported decisions many years after GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Con-
struction Pte Ltd & Anor.46
An obvious method to try to disapply the unconscionability exception would 
be to choose English law as the choice of law for the performance bond. This 
would potentially get round the ambiguity of whether parties may contract out of 
unconscionable behaviour. Instead, the problem could be presented to the court as 
a simple choice of law problem where the parties chose a foreign law. But choos-
ing a foreign law in this regard raises a conflict of laws issue: is the law governing 
injunctive relief in this context a procedural or substantive law? If it is the former, 
then the lex fori would apply. In contrast, if the matter is regarded as a substantive 
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48 Wahda Bank v Arab Bank plc [1999] EWCA Civ 1599.
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50 Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd v SNC Passion [2001] SGHC 140.
51 Shanghai Electric Group Co Ltd v PT Merak Energi Indonesia and another [2010] 2 SLR 329.
52 Scan-Bilt Pte Ltd v Umar Abdul Hamid [2004] SGDC 274.
law, then the choice of the law of the performance bond would apply. Andrews 
and Millett thought, albeit without citation of any authorities, that this was prob-
ably a matter of procedural law of the forum.47 Hence, on their analysis, the 
unconscionability exception would still apply. On the other hand, Professor Yeo 
argues that the injunction here is to protect substantive legal rights and hence 
should be governed by the choice of law. In other words, where an injunction is 
issued to protect legal rights, these rights are established by choice of law rules. 
Yeo, relying on the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Wahda Bank v Arab 
Bank plc,48 argues that ‘[w]here the issuer of a performance bond is refusing to 
pay the beneficiary because of the beneficiary’s fraud, the proper law of the per-
formance bond has been applied to determine the issue of fraud’.49 He concludes 
that this is a sensible conclusion because parties reasonably expect the proper law 
to apply to this question subject always to the fundamental public policy of the 
law of the forum.
Lee Seiu Kin JC (as he then was) foresaw this in Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte 
Ltd v SNC Passion50 where he speculated that if parties chose English law to govern 
the relevant contract and bond, there is the question as to whether a contract-
ing party may rely on unconscionability as an additional ground to restrain the 
bond. However, this was not a live issue in that case and he did not have to make 
a final decision. Many years later, the issue of a foreign choice of law governing 
the performance bond came to be considered before the same judge in Shanghai 
Electric Group Co Ltd v PT Merak Energi Indonesia and another.51 In this case, the 
plaintiff was hired by the defendant to construct a power plant in Indonesia. The 
contract provided for the defendant to pay the plaintiff an advance payment of 
10 per cent of the contract price which amounted to US$ 10.8 million by way of 
a performance bond. The contract and performance bond were both governed 
by English law. However, the Singapore Court was given a non-exclusive jurisdic-
tion to hear proceedings arising out of the bond. Lee J thought that a restraint on 
the beneficiary’s right to receive immediate payment on the bond would deprive 
the defendant of a substantive right envisaged by the bond. Since a substantive 
right was engaged, the choice of law would govern the relationship. It followed 
that English law would govern the restraint on a call on the bond. This holding is 
consistent with the position advocated by Professor Yeo as opposed to Andrews’ 
and Millett’s view.
Quite apart from choosing English law, another possibility would be to expressly 
exclude unconscionability as a ground for restraint from the terms of the perfor-
mance bond. The first case in which contracting parties sought to exclude uncon-
scionability as a ground of restraint is Scan-Bilt Pte Ltd v Umar Abdul Hamid.52 
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This is a little noticed case at the District Court level involving a performance 
bond for the value of S$125,000. In this case, the performance bond contained the 
following terms:
Except only in the clear case of fraud, the Contractor shall not be entitled to enjoin 
or restrain the Employer from making any call or demand on the performance bond 
or receiving monies under the performance bond, on any other ground including the 
ground of unconscionability.
This clause was not disclosed to the Court when the plaintiff obtained an ex parte 
injunction to restrain the performance bond. The defendant applied to discharge 
the injunction on the ground of a failure to make full and frank disclosure. Eugene 
Teo DJ thought that the plaintiff had failed to make full disclosure of this clause to 
the Court and discharged the injunction.
The issue of contracting out of unconscionability came to the fore recently in 
CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land Pte Ltd.53 In this case, the devel-
oper, Asplenium, employed CKR as a main contractor for the construction of a 
condominium in Singapore. The contract sum was S$88 million and CKR had 
to furnish Asplenium with an S$8.8 million performance bond. It was provided 
in the terms of the performance bond that CKR agreed that except in the case of 
fraud not to enjoin or restrain a call on the performance bond. Specifically, the 
terms of the bond mentioned that this prohibition against restraining a call on 
the performance bond included the ground of unconscionability. Subsequently, 
disagreement arose and Asplenium called on the bond. CKR retaliated by apply-
ing for an injunction to restrain the call on the performance bond. The issue that 
is relevant is whether the clause excluding a restrain based on unconscionability 
was unenforceable. At first instance, Edmund Leow JC held that this clause was 
unenforceable for three reasons. First, the clause was an attempt to oust the juris-
diction of the Court. Second, the power to grant injunctions emanated from the 
Court’s equitable jurisdiction which could not be limited by contract. Third, the 
unconscionability exception was premised on policy considerations which could 
not be excluded by contract.
On appeal, Andrew Phang JA, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
held that the clause excluding unconscionability was enforceable. As a starting 
point, Phang JA observed that while freedom of contract is the norm, the courts 
may override the contractual rights of the parties on public policy concerns such 
as an ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts. However, the countervailing consid-
eration is that courts should be careful not to apply this policy concern to situa-
tions where contracting parties place limitations on their rights and remedies. Such 
limitations on rights and remedies such as a limitation of damages have not been 
treated as an ouster of the court’s jurisdiction. The learned judge thought that the 
present clause ‘was more in the nature of an exclusion or exception clause (as opposed 
to a clause seeking to oust the jurisdiction of the court)’ (emphasis in original).54  
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In other words, the present clause is one which sought to limit the right to an equi-
table remedy and not a clause which sought to oust the jurisdiction of the court. 
Phang JA said that this clause is potentially subject to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act and might be unenforceable if it was regarded as unreasonable.55 However, this 
was not an argument that was run and Justice Phang did not state a conclusive view 
on this issue.
With regard to the argument that a contractual clause excluding unconscion-
ability was unenforceable on public policy grounds, the learned judge observed as 
follows:
The particular conception of policy that formed the basis for the unconscionability doc-
trine is quite different from the concept of public policy which underpins the category of 
contracts which are void and unenforceable as being contrary to public policy as such 
contracts seek to oust the jurisdiction of the court (emphasis in original).56
CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land Pte Ltd has drawn some dis-
quiet from commentators. For example, Dora Neo comments that ‘one might 
feel slightly uncomfortable that the “bad guys”, that is, beneficiaries who call on 
performance bonds in unconscionable circumstances, should be allowed to have 
their way’.57 However, Neo rationalised that it is ultimately up to the obligor of 
the performance bond to decide if it is willing to forego equity’s protection in this 
context. Lau Kwan Ho has also subjected this decision to an extensive critique in 
a Modern Law Review piece.58 Lau has three major criticisms of the position that 
parties may exclude injunctive relief premised on unconscionable conduct. First, 
he stresses that there is a difference between primary and secondary obligations 
pursuant to the contract. A primary obligation is an obligation to perform the 
contract whereas a secondary obligation arises to pay damages in the event of a 
breach. He argues that the court when deciding to order an injunction is essen-
tially seeking to enforce primary obligations under the contract. In other words, 
‘[t]he right to expect contractual performance is generally allied to a right to seek 
equitable relief to compel such performance’.59 While it is relatively uncontro-
versial for parties to contractually limit their liabilities under a secondary obliga-
tion, it is questionable whether parties may contractually amend the content and 
the performance of their primary obligations. Second, parties should not be able 
to exclude the unconscionability exception due to its underlying policy. Accord-
ing to Lau, ‘[t]he true policy at work here is that of ensuring that parties do not 
contract themselves out of the law’.60 Third, unconscionability like fraud should 
Equity, Trusts and Commerce, edited by Paul S. Davies, and James Penner, Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2017. ProQuest Ebook
         Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=4829994.
Created from smu on 2018-09-24 19:21:28.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
7.
 B
lo
om
sb
ur
y 
P
ub
lis
hi
ng
 P
LC
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
64 Tang Hang Wu
61 ibid 475.
62 Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 36, [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 586 (CA).
63 Ho (n 58) 476.
64 Debattista (n 16) 304.
fall within ‘the sphere of general immunity from contractual manipulation’.61 He 
cites Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd62 as support for the proposition that 
it is not possible to exclude liability for fraud or wilful damage. Lau concludes 
‘that people expect and are entitled to nothing less than honest dealing in their 
relationships’.63
Implicit in Lau’s analysis is the assumption that the primary contractual obli-
gation contained in a performance bond is that the beneficiary is only entitled 
to make genuine calls on the bond if the beneficiary has suffered damage under 
the underlying contract. As such, the beneficiary is under a primary obligation 
not to make an unconscionable call on the bond which is abusive and tactical. 
While I see some merit in this characterisation, it is ultimately question begging 
and circular. Lau’s thesis starts with the premise that parties may not limit the 
primary obligations inherent in the contract. In order to reach the conclusion that 
unconscionability may not be excluded contractually he assumes that the obliga-
tion not to make unconscionable calls on the bond is within the primary obliga-
tion of the parties. In my view, the debate on whether it is possible to contractually 
exclude the unconscionability exception in relation to a performance bond cannot 
be resolved by dividing the contractual obligations undertaken by the parties into 
a neat dichotomy of primary and secondary obligations. In contrast to Lau, the 
Court of Appeal noted that performance bond in this particular context was pro-
vided in lieu of a cash deposit. Thus, if we proceed with this line of analysis, the 
primary obligation of the parties is that the bond is to function as a cash deposit 
and the beneficiary is entitled to call on the bond save for the fraud exception. Or 
to put this in another way, it could be argued that the primary obligation on the 
obligor is not to apply for an injunction restraining payment save for fraud. In 
other words, the contractual exclusion of the unconscionability exception restores 
the cracked image (using Debattista’s imagery)64 between the performance bond 
and letter of credit. Another way of putting the argument in support of the Court 
of Appeal’s decision is that the parties have by contract incorporated the auton-
omy principle inherent in letters of credit within their obligations under the per-
formance bond.
It is suggested that the most pertinent issue inherent in the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land Pte Ltd is whether 
there is a public policy objection to allow a contracting party to exclude liability 
for one own’s unconscionable conduct. This is a distinct policy consideration 
from the public policy of ousting the court’s jurisdiction which was considered 
extensively by the Court of Appeal. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal did not 
deal with this issue squarely in their judgment. Instead, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal concentrates solely on the question whether an exclusion of 
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 unconscionability is an ouster of the court’s jurisdiction. Perhaps this was because 
of the manner in which arguments developed before the Court of Appeal. As Lau 
correctly points out, there is English authority which suggest that it is not pos-
sible to contractually exclude liability for fraudulent conduct. Similarly, it is not 
possible to contract out for liability for a person’s fraudulent misrepresentation.65 
However, Andrew Burrows points out that ‘the question of whether, as a matter 
of public policy, one can exclude other forms of conduct somewhat analogous 
to fraud, such as duress and undue influence, appears not to have been decided 
or discussed’.66 Ultimately, this is a policy choice which the courts have to make, 
ie, between freedom of contract between the parties and the court’s ability to 
intervene where one party is exercising his or her legal rights in an unconscion-
able manner. The Court of Appeal in Singapore seems to have made the choice 
in preference of the former policy, ie, respecting the contractual bargain struck 
by the parties. However, the counter argument against this is that the rationale of 
unconscionability doctrine in relation to performance bonds is that it was devel-
oped to prevent abusive calls and mitigate the unequal bargaining power of the 
parties.67 If so, then a case may be made for holding that unconscionability like 
the fraud exception is not a ground which may be excluded by the parties. This is 
because large contracting parties may now insist on such clauses being included 
in their contracts. Be that as it may, this is not the position adopted by the Court 
of Appeal. The issue of the contracting parties’ behaviour will be explored in the 
empirical part of the chapter.
V. Analysis of the Survey of the Cases
A comprehensive review of the reported and unreported Singapore case law was 
conducted using the database Lawnet68 to survey all the cases which have discussed 
the unconscionability exception post GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction 
Pte Ltd & Anor.69 The present author reviewed all the cases which came up with 
the relevant search terms and identified the decisions directly relevant to applica-
tions restraining performance bonds. The author then read the cases while taking 
note of the subject matter of the suit, the quantum of the performance bond and 
whether the application to restrain the performance bond was ultimately success-
ful. Where the case was appealed to the Court of Appeal, the author only took note 
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and reviewed the appellate court’s decision to prevent a double counting of cases. 
While reviewing the grounds of decision, the author also took note of the judges’ 
reasons in allowing or dismissing such applications. The data is summarised in a 
table marked Appendix A to this chapter.
The survey of the cases reveals that there were 31 reported and unreported cases 
between 2000 and 2015. Over a span of 15 years, this averages to two cases per year 
which suggests that there were not many applications to restrain calls on perfor-
mance bonds. Prima facie, these figures suggest that the number of attempts to 
restrain performance bonds is at a tolerable level. However, these figures are not 
conclusive because the practice is that judges in Singapore would only write the 
grounds of decision when a party lodges a notice of appeal. It may be that there 
were many applications to restrain performance bonds where the losing party 
did not lodge a notice of appeal. Thus, this survey is inconclusive as to the actual 
number of challenges filed by contracting parties in Singapore to restrain calls on 
performance bonds. The limited conclusion which may be reached with the data is 
that the number of appeals resulting from applications to restrain a performance 
bond does not happen frequently in Singapore.
A summary of the number of cases broken down in the five-year period and the 
success rate is found in the table below.
Table 3.1: Summary of the Number of Cases
Time period Number of cases Percentage Number of 
cases which 
were successful
Remark
2000–05 14 45.2 6 11 of the challenges 
were between 2000 
and 2002
2005–10 6 19.4 3
2010–15 11 35.5 4 9 cases between 
2013 and 2015
It is also interesting that out of 31 reported and unreported decisions, 11 of 
these cases were dated between 2000 and 2002. This represented 35 per cent of 
all the reported and unreported decisions. This could potentially be explained 
on the fact that when the unconscionability exception was first recognised, the 
contours of the doctrine were not fully mapped out. As a result, there were fre-
quent challenges. As the case law developed and more guidance was given by the 
courts, the challenges become less frequent. However, this hypothesis does not 
explain the spike of cases which happened subsequently, ie, 35.5 per cent which 
occurred between 2010 and 2015. Out of 11 cases between 2010 and 2015, nine 
of the cases were reported between 2013 and 2015. This is rather surprising con-
sidering this period was after the Court of Appeal’s decision in BS Mount Sophia 
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70 BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd (n 14).
Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd70 where Andrew Phang JA said that the decision to 
restrain a performance bond should be exercised sparingly and that it would 
be difficult for a party to show a strong prima facie case of unconscionability. 
Perhaps, the only way to explain the data is that the number of applications to 
restrain performance bonds closely mirrors the construction industry and state 
of the economy of Singapore. Recall that Singapore suffered a prolonged eco-
nomic slump which affected the property market between 2001 and 2006 due 
to global events like the ‘September 11’ attacks on the New York World Trade 
Center and the SARs crisis that affected Asia. Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
there were only two cases between 2002 and 2005 because it is likely that the 
construction industry in Singapore suffered a slowdown due to the economy. 
Subsequently, the property market in Singapore experienced a sharp rise which 
led to more construction projects. Thus, this could explain the spike of cases 
between 2010 and 2015 as more construction projects were completed and the 
performance bonds in relation to these projects were engaged.
In terms of successful applications to restrain calls on performance bonds, we 
see 13 successful challenges out of 31 of the reported and unreported cases. These 
figures include partial restraints on calls of performance bonds. This represents 
a 41 per cent success rate out of the reported and unreported cases. Again, this 
figure is not indicative of the overall success rate of all applications. As mentioned 
above, there would not be any grounds of decision if parties did not file a notice 
of appeal. It could be that parties were more inclined to file a notice of appeal in 
situations where the application to restrain a performance bond is successful.
The quantum value of the performance bonds in the cases is summarised as 
follows in the table below.
Table 3.2: Value of the Performance Bonds
Quantum (in Singapore dollars) Number of cases
≤250,000 11
≥250,000 ≤750,000 6
≥750,000 ≤1,000,000 2
≥1,000,000 10
Not stated 2
The most number of challenges from the reported and unreported cases comes 
from the lower tier in terms of the quantum of performance bond, ie, below 
S$250,000. There are several possible explanations for this. First, it could simply 
be that there are more small-scale construction projects which are valued at S$2.5 
million and below (the bond is usually 10 per cent of the project price). Second, 
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abusive and tactical calls are more common in smaller scale projects. It should 
also be noted that there are 10 applications to restrain bonds which are worth 
more than S$1 million. Again, this could tentatively be explained on the num-
ber of projects and unconscionable calls on performance bonds within this band. 
These explanations are only tentative hypotheses.
Although Andrew Phang JA in BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd71 
disavowed a formulaic approach to unconscionability and counselled that the 
whole broad set of facts must be analysed, the present author attempted to isolate 
the factors in which the judges have regarded as significant in holding that a call 
was unconscionable. In terms of mapping out unconscionable calls on perfor-
mance bonds, the following are factors which the courts have taken into account:
(i) The delay in the works was contributed by the beneficiary of the bond.72
(ii) There is independent evidence such as evidence from the architect that 
there was no delay/defect in the works.73
(iii) The beneficiary did not assert that it had suffered damage.74
(iv) The alleged damages/rectification works were based on arbitrary figures or 
grossly inflated.75
(v) The claim for damages was already time barred.76
(vi) There was a partial restraint of the bond because the contract sum had 
been reduced.77
(vii) No performance was due because the defendant’s main contract had been 
terminated.78
(viii) The call on the bond was not due to the plaintiff ’s poor performance but 
based on an ulterior motive to attempt to force the plaintiff to take over a 
contract.79
The judges have not placed much emphasis on the knowledge of the obligee in 
calling on the bond. Instead, the judges rely on written documentation such as 
letters and architects’ certificates in establishing the factors listed above. Unfortu-
nately, there does not seem to be a hierarchy of the factors and thus there is some 
uncertainty inherent in the application of these factors. It is hoped that by listing 
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80 Horowitz (n 35) 163.
down these various factors, this would assist practitioners and judges in determin-
ing when it is regarded as unconscionable to call on a performance bond. In ana-
lysing the jurisprudence from Singapore, Deborah Horowitz suggested that many 
of the instances could be analysed as coming within the fraud exception on the 
grounds that the beneficiary had no honest belief that the beneficiary was entitled 
to call on the bond. Horowitz writes:
One chief difficulty with the Singaporean cases on unconscionable conduct in relation to 
abstract payment instruments is that the courts seem to have forgotten about the fraud 
defence—or, rather, the applicant in the cases frequently does not plead it. It is true that 
there are risks for a party (or its counsel) who pleads fraud: one must genuinely believe 
in, and have sufficient proof of, the fraud allegation. Nonetheless, given the potential 
fraud and unconscionable conduct, it is still surprising that parties have chosen to plead 
the latter defence, but not the former, in many of the cases.80
With respect, there are several problems with the passage above. On a descriptive 
level, this statement is wrong because the multiple factors the courts have consid-
ered show quite conclusively that the unconscionability exception goes beyond 
the no honest belief analysis. The underlying thread running through most of 
the factors identified above is that the beneficiary of the bond is not entitled to 
the damages pursuant to the underlying contract between the parties. In order 
to determine this enquiry, the courts would have to assess the underlying dispute 
between the parties. If the court is of the view that there is a genuine contractual 
dispute between the parties, the court would not restrain the call on the perfor-
mance bond but ask the parties to proceed to arbitration or litigation. However, 
if there is strong evidence that the damages are not due, the courts would regard 
this as a case of an unconscionable call on the performance bond. Horowitz’s criti-
cism that the Singapore judges and practitioners have forgotten about the fraud 
defence is both condescending and wrong. As she rightly notes, in many cases, this 
ground is not asserted by counsel. Therefore, it is perplexing for Horowitz to criti-
cise the Singapore courts as having forgotten about the fraud exception. Further, 
there is an obvious and practical reason why fraud is not pursued by counsel—the 
standard of proof associated with fraud is almost impossible to make out at the 
interlocutory stage. This is a frequent refrain from the survey of the practitioners 
and it is to this part that we now turn in the next section.
VI. Survey of Construction Law Practitioners  
Based in Singapore
Since most of the cases on performance bonds arose from construction disputes, 
the present author embarked on a survey of leading building and construction 
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81 www.chambersandpartners.com/guide/asia/8/188/1.
82 www.legal500.com/c/singapore/.
lawyers to attempt to get the practitioners’ insight into various problems asso-
ciated with the unconscionability exception. The questions used in the survey 
are found in Appendix B. In particular, the survey asks, inter alia, the following 
questions:
(i) Are clients concerned about a potential restraint on performance bonds at 
the contract formation stage?
(ii) If they are concerned, do clients factor this into the contract price?
(iii) Do clients choose a foreign law to govern the performance bond?
(iv) Do clients seek to exclude unconscionability as a ground for restraint from 
the words of the performance bond?
(v) How often do you see calls on performance bonds which are tactical and 
abusive?
(vi) Is the law in Singapore clear enough for you to advise your client on 
restraining a call on a performance bond?
(vii) What is a ballpark figure as to hearing days and costs for restraining a call 
on a performance bond?
(viii) How often do parties appeal a court’s decision to allow or deny a restrain a 
call on a performance bond?
(ix) Do parties attempt to settle disputes on a restraint on a call on a perfor-
mance bond? What are the impediments to settlement, if any?
(x) In your personal opinion, is unconscionability as a separate ground for 
restraining performance bonds a positive or negative development?
In order to carry out the survey, the author used two leading online legal guides to 
practitioners—Chambers and Partners81 and Legal 500.82 Chambers and Partners 
listed the following as the leading firms in construction law.
Band 1
Pinsent Masons MPillay LLP
WongPartnership LLP
Band 2
Allen & Gledhill LLP
Clifford Chance
Hogan Lovells Lee & Lee
Band 3
Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP
Rodyk & Davidson LLP
TSMP Law Corporation
The author emailed the survey questions to a construction partner in the firms 
listed above. Some partners were happy to fill out the survey and others who 
were busy preferred a short telephone interview. The present author managed 
to get survey responses from lawyers from all these firms listed in Chambers and 
 Partners. Care was also taken not to speak to multiple lawyers from the same firm 
in order to prevent a particular firm’s practice from the skewing the data. The only 
exception was one firm on this list where the author spoke to both the construc-
tion partner and also a partner with a commercial arbitration/shipping practice. 
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This was because the latter partner was counsel in a major case on the restraint of a 
performance bond in the High Court and Court of Appeal. In order to enlarge on 
the sample size, the author also consulted the online version Legal 500 directory. 
Unlike Chambers and Partners, Legal 500 does not have a discrete construction 
law section but lists the lawyers within a combined category of Real Estate and 
Construction. The author went through the list and found three lawyers on the 
Legal 500 list with a construction practice focus who were willing to complete the 
survey. There was also the fear that both the Chambers and Partners and Legal 500 
list of lawyers would be lawyers who advise on big deals and the response would 
not accurately reflect the views of the smaller players. To counter this potential 
bias in the data, the present author managed to speak to three lawyers in small 
law firm practice who identified their practice as mainly in the construction field. 
Overall, the author managed to obtain 15 survey responses.
In relation to whether clients are concerned with a restraint on a call of a per-
formance bond at the contract formation stage, the responses were almost evenly 
split. Seven of the lawyers surveyed said that their clients were not concerned with 
such a risk at the contracting stage. Several lawyers said that their clients were more 
concerned at this stage about the details and profitability of the project rather than 
worrying about the performance bond. Also, at the contracting stage, parties were 
typically very optimistic about the project and did not think that the performance 
bond would have to be engaged in the future. Two lawyers gave a qualified answer 
to this issue, ie, that some of their clients were now aware of the possibility that 
unconscionability as a ground for restraint may be excluded by the contractual 
provisions post the decision in CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land 
Pte Ltd.83 The remaining six lawyers surveyed said their clients were concerned 
with the risk of injunctive relief against a call on a performance bond at contract-
ing stage. These responses suggest a high level of sophistication in terms of clients’ 
awareness of the law in this area. Furthermore, most of the respondents who said 
that their clients were concerned about restraints on performance bonds thought 
that their clients would have factored this risk into the contract pricing, although 
it is difficult to tell precisely how this risk was priced.
The survey responses also showed that there are practical reasons for parties 
not choosing a foreign law to govern the performance bond if the construction 
project is in Singapore. The main reason seems to be that for such contracts the 
entity which issues the performance bond would either be a Singapore bank or 
insurer. Singapore banks and insurers have certain regulatory concerns about issu-
ing an English law governed bond. In addition, Singapore banks and insurers were 
less comfortable with issuing bonds governed by English law because they would 
usually not have English qualified in-house legal counsel on their staff. A very 
significant development from the survey results is that lawyers from three law firms 
considered the ‘Big Four’ law firms in Singapore indicated that they are  receiving 
83 CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd (n 53).
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84 ibid.
many enquiries about excluding unconscionability as a ground for restraint 
in their contracts after the case of CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land 
Pte Ltd.84 In fact, one of these lawyers who is the construction head of a Big Four 
law firm said that this is done ‘[i]n almost every construction contract that we 
assist clients on’. Another construction lawyer in a Big Four law firm said that this 
is a trend in 50 per cent of the cases because the clients’ quantity surveyors are now 
aware that the law allows parties to contract out of unconscionability. This lawyer 
said that he expected an upward trend in the practice of excluding unconscion-
ability in the future. The practice of excluding unconscionability from the terms 
of the bond is not confined to local Singapore law firms. At least two partners in 
international law firms have reported the same phenomenon of excluding uncon-
scionability in the terms of the performance bond. If this practice spreads across 
all the law firms, this could potentially spell the demise of the ground of uncon-
scionability as a separate ground of restraint for performance bonds because par-
ties would have excluded this ground from the terms of the bond.
The responses were mixed in terms of the number of calls on performance 
bonds that the lawyers have encountered in their practice which they considered 
to be tactical and abusive. Seven of the respondents said that they often see calls 
on bonds which are abusive and tactical. In contrast, the remaining eight lawyers 
thought that abusive calls on performance were relatively rare. Several lawyers 
who said that abusive calls were rare were sanguine and observed that this ques-
tion was very subjective and really depended on the profile of their client. Obvi-
ously, those who were acting for owners/employers thought they were entitled to 
call on the bond. With regard to lawyers who said they often see abusive calls, a 
respondent wrote:
We see calls that are obviously aimed at putting contractors under financial pres-
sure to compromise and settle claims, or to accept the employer’s demands. There are 
P[erformance] Bond calls which seem to be aimed at causing insolvency so that the con-
tractor cannot pursue its claims in Court/Arbitration.
Another common tactic is to inflate the alleged damages suffered or to unjustifi-
ably assert that the contractor had delayed the works. A senior construction lawyer 
in a Big Four law firm said:
Calls which are tactical and abusive are calls for amounts which do not reflect the amount 
of losses which the Employer has suffered. Usually these losses are inflated as a result of 
large amounts of liquidated damages which are, in turn, based on delays for which the 
Contractors have not been given adequate extensions of time.
Some lawyers also explained that calls on performance bonds are used in the con-
tractual power play between the parties to obtain leverage against the other side. 
One scenario mentioned by three respondents is that the bond may be called by 
the employer when the contractor asks for payment pursuant to the adjudication 
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85 Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, 2006 Rev Ed).
process enacted under the Security of Payment Act.85 By way of background, the 
adjudication process was set up to speed up payment in the building and con-
struction industry. Viewed in this context, the call is usually aimed at retaliating at 
the contractor for seeking out the adjudication process. As one respondent from a 
small practice observed, sub-contractors are very concerned that if they take out 
an application under the adjudication process, their main contractor will call on 
their bond.
All the lawyers unanimously said that their clients have asked them to restrain 
calls on performance bonds. This is an unsurprising result and suggests that appli-
cations to restrain performance bonds are far more common than the 31 reported 
and unreported cases surveyed in the earlier part. What is interesting is that the 
lawyers are again divided on the clarity of the law on unconscionability. Eight law-
yers thought that the law was clear enough for them to advise their clients on appli-
cations to restrain performance bonds. However, the remaining seven respondents 
disagreed. As a construction partner in an international law firm points out:
What remains for counsel like us is to survey precedent decisions in which restraint 
had been ordered for conduct amounting to ‘unconscionability’ and to try to align 
our clients’ case accordingly. Even so, results may vary from case to case, and although 
these are largely facts-dependent, we also suggest that to a lesser degree, it can also be 
tribunal-dependent.
Another construction lawyer gave the following ambivalent answer and referred to 
unconscionability as an oxymoronic ‘known unknown’. He said:
Yes and no in that the law is clearly unclear. The courts have deliberately left the test for 
unconscionability quite fluid with no pre-determined categories of unconscionability. So 
it is a known unknown, except perhaps where the facts are close to those in previously 
decided cases of unconscionability.
The responses which said that the law was unclear all pointed out that uncon-
scionability is very fact-sensitive and would depend on the judge hearing the case.
In terms of hearing dates and ballpark figures as to cost, 13 of the 15 lawyers 
provided information on this. All 13 lawyers said that a hearing date could be held 
within one to two days. The costs estimate involved ranged between $8,000 and 
$100,000 depending on the size of the bond and the complexity of the matter. 
However, the average costs provided by the lawyers were between $30,000 and 
$50,000. With regard to settlement of disputes on calls on performance bond, the 
respondents pointed out the parties usually do not regard the performance bond 
issue as a discrete dispute. Instead, there are usually multiple disputes between the 
parties at the material time. If a settlement was to be reached, it would be a global 
settlement with regard to the entire myriad of issues between the parties. Some 
lawyers pointed out that the performance bond is often used as a form of leverage 
in these negotiations. If the owner/employer has successfully called on the bond, 
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then the owner/employer is regarded as having the upper hand. However, if the 
obligor has successfully restrained a call on the performance bond, then the bar-
gaining position is equalised somewhat.
The responses to the final question as to whether unconscionability is a posi-
tive or negative development saw a majority of the lawyers (10 out of 15) saying 
that this was a positive development in the law. Several reasons were proffered in 
support of the position that this was a positive development. First, several lawyers 
pointed out that the threshold of establishing fraud as a ground of restraint was 
almost impossible to achieve in practice. Second, the lawyers supportive of the 
unconscionability exception said that this ground deals effectively with abusive 
calls on performance bonds. Third, some lawyers pointed out that the uncon-
scionability doctrine evens out (to a certain extent) the unequal bargaining posi-
tion between parties in the building construction contract. Otherwise, contractors 
are powerless in the face of an abusive call on a performance bond. In contrast 
to the positive responses, two lawyers said that this was a negative development 
pointing out that unconscionability is an uncertain concept. The remaining three 
lawyers were ambivalent about the unconscionability exception—they said they 
understood what the courts were trying to do but raised the uncertainty of the 
ambit of the unconscionability exception.
Several tentative conclusions may be drawn from this limited survey of practi-
tioners’ responses. First, from the responses from three of the Big Four law firms, 
clients (or their legal advisers) who have the upper hand in terms of the bargain-
ing power were uncomfortable with the inherent uncertainty associated with the 
unconscionability exception to calls on performance bonds. These clients are now 
actively excluding unconscionability from the terms of the bond. In fact, one of 
these Big Four law firms is advising all their clients to exclude unconscionability. 
If this trend becomes common place, it is surmised that this will herald the death 
of unconscionability as a separate ground of restraint. Second, while some lawyers 
complain about the uncertainty which unconscionability entails, others are per-
fectly comfortable with the open-ended nature of the law. This may be explained 
by lawyers who may have differing philosophies, ie, those who prefer certainty 
to lawyers who are happy to leave the courts with the residual guided discretion 
to determine which situations are regarded as unconscionable. Third, some law-
yers report that abusive calls on performance bonds are unfortunately common in 
Singapore’s construction industry. Fourth, the hearing days and costs of resolving 
performance bond issues are not excessive in Singapore, typically taking one or 
two days and costing between S$30,000 and S$50,000. Finally, two-thirds of the 
lawyers surveyed thought that was a positive development in the law. There could 
be several explanations for this. It could be that all these lawyers saw the policy 
reasons for adopting the unconscionability doctrine in relation to performance 
bonds and could tolerate a degree of uncertainty inherent in its application in 
advising their clients. Next, another potential explanation is local pride in the Sin-
gapore court developing its own jurisprudence. Of course there is the more cyni-
cal explanation that the inherent uncertainty of the concept of unconscionability 
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86 See S Menon, ‘Transnational Commercial Law: Realities, Challenges and a Call for Meaningful 
Convergence’ [2013] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 231; FHR European Ventures LLP & Ors v Cedar 
Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, [2015] AC 250 (HL) [45] (Lord Neuberger).
meant that this would generate more legal work for the practitioners, and hence 
they viewed this development of the law as a positive one.
VII. Conclusion
Singapore’s experiment with unconscionability presents an interesting case study 
of equity’s jurisprudence operating in the market place. While there have been 
high level calls that it is desirable for common law courts to reach similar conclu-
sions in matters pertaining to the commercial law,86 Singapore’s divergence rep-
resents a conscious policy choice in the face of local imperatives, ie, abusive calls 
on performance bonds. The aim of this chapter has been to sketch out the devel-
opments in the law since the recognition of the unconscionability exception by 
surveying all the case law and leading construction law practitioners’ perspectives 
on the operation of the unconscionability exception. As an overarching theme, the 
conclusion reached by the present author is that although the concept of uncon-
scionability does entail a degree of uncertainty, it has worked in Singapore in this 
context. In terms of the number of reported and unreported cases, the survey of 
the cases shows that it is at a low level, ie, an average of two cases per year. Hearing 
days on unconscionability do not seem to be protracted (one or two days) and 
the costs of hearings were not too astronomical. Furthermore, while some practi-
tioners lamented on the inherent uncertainty associated with unconscionability, 
others thought the law was clear enough for them to advise their clients. It is also 
telling that 10 out of the 15 practitioners surveyed thought that the unconscion-
ability exception was a positive development. But the survey results also show that 
we may be at the beginning stage of the ultimate demise of the unconscionabil-
ity exception. Since the Court of Appeal’s holding that unconscionability may be 
excluded from the terms of the bond, the largest law firms in Singapore are seeing 
their clients contracting out of unconscionability. If this trend persists, we may 
find unconscionability in relation to performance bonds as merely a legal histori-
cal footnote in Singapore’s jurisprudence.
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Appendix A
S/No Date reported Name of case Subject matter 
of suit
Quantum 
involved
Successful 
application?
Reasons/interesting features
1. 4 March 2015 JK Integrated (Pte 
Ltd) v 50 Robinson 
Pte Ltd and another 
[2015] SGHC 57
Building and 
construction
$4.7 million   — No under certification of payment.
 — Owner did not delay the works.
2. 22 April 2015 A1 Design & Build 
Pte Ltd v Neo 
Choon Seng [2015] 
SGDC 86
Building and 
construction
$159,600   — No delay in the work as the work 
was certified by the architect.
 — Alleged delay was contributed by 
the beneficiary of the bond.
 — There’s evidence that the owner 
confirmed that there is no defect.
3. 16 Jan 2014 CAA Technologies 
Pte Ltd v BHCC 
Construction Pte 
Ltd and ABN Amro 
Bank NV [2014] 
SGDC 25
Building and 
construction
$534,080   — This was an advance payment 
bond.
 — Genuine dispute as between 
the parties on performance and 
amount due.
4. 27 Feb 2014 Builders Designers 
Engineers (Bde) 
Pte Ltd v Sin Chew 
Woodpaq Pte Ltd 
[2014] SGDC 78
Building and 
construction
$199,900   — Allegation that progressive 
payment was not paid rejected: 
payment not endorsed by the 
professional engineer.
 — Evidence by quantity surveyor 
that the owner had overpaid the 
contractor.
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5. 16 April 2014 CCM Industrial Pte 
Ltd v 70 Shenton 
Pte Ltd and another 
[2014] SGHC 75
Building and 
construction
$4,728,250   — Evidence of delay in the works.
6. 31 March 2014 Tech-System Design 
& Contract (S) 
Pte Ltd v WYWY 
Investments Pte Ltd 
[2014] SGHC 57
Building and 
construction
$988,888   — Architect has not certified an 
extension of time: owner prima 
facie entitled to claim liquidated 
damages.
7. 24 April 2013 Ryobi-Kiso (S) 
Pte Ltd v Lum 
Chang Building 
Contractors Pte Ltd 
and another [2013] 
SGHC 86
Building and 
construction
$1.88 m   — There was clear evidence of 
breaches of contract.
 — Plaintiff was in delay of the 
contract.
 — Genuine construction disputes 
between the parties.
8. 1 July 2013 York International 
Pte Ltd v Voltas 
Limited [2013] 3 
SLR 1142
Supply, deliver, 
test and 
commission 
chillers
Not stated: 10% 
of the purchase 
price
 (on the 
grounds 
that this is a 
conditional 
bond)
 — Bond was interpreted to be 
conditional.
 — Ambiguity should be construed 
against the beneficiary.
 — Deliberate omission of the word 
‘unconditional’.
 — Beneficiary did not assert damage 
due to breach of contract.
(continuted)
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9. 5 August 2013 Scada Solutions Pte 
Ltd v Anderco Pte 
Ltd [2013] SGDC 
237
Building and 
construction
$188,000 (restrained 
for 
$156,616.08)
 — Call on performance bond based 
on an arbitrary figure of alleged 
damages.
 — Set off not quantified with details 
and particulars as required by the 
set off provisions in the contract.
 — No delay certificate or certificate 
of practical completion relied 
in quantifying the liquidated 
damages.
 — The Defendant had written to the 
Plaintiff prior to the call on the 
performance bond saying that 
the Plaintiff owes the Defendant 
$47,583.92.
10. 18 April 2012 Master Marine AS  
v Labroy Offshore 
Ltd and others 
[2012] 3 SLR 125
International 
shipbuilding 
contract: offshore 
elevating rig
Five instalments: 
not stated in the 
report
  — Doctrine of strict compliance 
applied.
11. 9 May 2012 BS Mount Sophia 
Pte Ltd v Join-Aim 
Pte Ltd [2012] 3 
SLR 352
Building and 
construction
$484,440   — There was evidence that the 
completion date had been pushed 
back.
 — There was evidence that the 
beneficiary of the bond did not 
genuinely believe that the Plaintiff 
was responsible for the delay.
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12. 6 January 2010 Shanghai Electric 
Group Co Ltd  
v PT Merak Energi 
Indonesia and 
another [2010] 2 
SLR 329
Building and 
construction
$10.8 m   — Bond governed by English law.
 — Genuine disputes of contract.
 — The bond was given to secure 
advanced payment.
13. 27 January 
2010
Polink Engineering 
Pte Ltd v Chen 
Hwei Lai & Ors 
[2010] SGDC 36
Building and 
construction
$123,800   — The Defendant had interfered with 
the previous architect.
 — Changed an architect and found a 
‘compliant’ architect who certified 
on the calling of the performance 
bond.
14. 3 December 
2010
JBE Properties Pte 
Ltd v Gammon Pte 
Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 
47
Building and 
construction
$1,151,500   — The terms of the performance 
bond mentioned unconscionability 
as reason for non-payment.
 — Quotation for rectification works 
obtained by the owners was grossly 
inflated.
 — Owner never gave the contractor 
a chance to rectify the alleged 
defects.
 — Cost of alleged rectification works 
is less than amount owed.
(continuted)
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15. 26 August 
2010
Astrata (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd v Tridex 
Technologies Pte 
Ltd and another 
and other matters 
[2011] 1 SLR 449
Building and 
construction
$490,000   — Strong prima facie case of 
unconscionability not made out.
 — Genuine disputes of contracts 
which should be referred to 
arbitration.
16. 12 January 
2009
Leighton 
Contractors 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd 
v J-Power Systems 
Corp and Another 
[2009] SGHC 7
Building and 
construction
$956,395   — Genuine disputes of contract.
17. 12 September 
2006
Econ Piling Pte Ltd 
v Aviva General 
Insurance Pte Ltd 
and another [2006] 
4 SLR(R) 501
Building and 
construction
$173,400   — Claim was already time barred.
18. 4 November 
2004
Scan-Bilt Pte Ltd  
v Umar Abdul 
Hamid [2004] 
SGDC 274
Building and 
construction
$125,000   — Clause in Performance 
Bond specifically excluded 
unconscionability as a ground to 
restrain payment.
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19. 26 June 2003 Newtech 
Engineering 
Construction 
Pte Ltd v BKB 
Engineering 
Constructions Pte 
Ltd and others 
[2003] 4 SLR(R) 73
Building and 
construction
$200,000
$43,150
  — Defendant had 37 legal actions 
against it.
 — Discrepancy in the final statement 
of account: the damages claimed 
had ballooned in five months.
20. 15 January 
2002
McConnell Dowell 
Constructors (Aust)  
Pty Ltd v Sembcorp 
Engineers and 
Constructors Pte Ltd 
(formerly known 
as SembCorp 
Construction Pte 
Ltd) [2002] 1 
SLR(R) 60
Building and 
construction
$125 m   — Bank guarantee was provided to be 
called if the proposed funder failed 
to procure financing.
 — It was clear that the proposed 
funder had failed to procure 
financing.
21. 17 July 2002 Seng Hock Heng 
Contractor Pte Ltd 
v Hup Seng Bee 
Construction Pte 
Ltd and another 
[2002] 2 SLR(R) 
486
Building and 
construction
$1,295,000   — ‘The evidence before me is 
inconclusive and difficult to 
evaluate although, if pressed, my 
sympathy inclines towards the 
plaintiff ’.
(continuted)
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22. 31 October 
2002
Hiap Tian Soon 
Construction Pte 
Ltd and another  
v Hola Development 
Pte Ltd and another 
[2003] 1 SLR(R) 
667
Building and 
construction
$1,009,000  (only 
entitled to 
call for  
$ 790,000
 — Contract sum had been reduced 
from $10 m to $7.9 m.
23. 25 November 
2002
Anwar Siraj and 
another v Teo 
Hee Lai Building 
Construction 
Pte Ltd [2003] 1 
SLR(R) 394
Building and 
construction
$120,000   — Owner was an extremely difficult 
person.
 — Owner interfered with architect.
 — Owner denied Plaintiff the 
opportunity to remedy the work.
 — Not sufficient to be regarded as 
unconscionable.
24. 20 June 2001 Marinteknik 
Shipbuilders (S) Pte 
Ltd v SNC Passion 
[2001] SGHC 140
Shipbuilding €666,000   — Genuine disputes as to the defects.
25. 8 October 
2001
Prolian M&E 
Services Pte Ltd  
v Loh Lin Kett 
[2001] SGDC 322
Building and 
construction
$74,000   — The Defendant’s main contract 
had been terminated.
 — No performance due from the 
Plaintiff.
 — There was no basis for the 
Defendant to call on the 
performance bond.
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26. 10 October 
2001
Global Facade 
(S) Pte Ltd v Eng 
Lim Construction 
Company Private 
Limited [2001] 
SGDC 325
Building and 
construction
$93,000   — Project was certified by the 
architect as completed.
 — Call was two years after completion.
 — Defendant has not filed any legal 
proceedings to pursue its alleged 
claims.
27. 20 October 
2001
WW Welding & 
Construction Pte 
Ltd v Multiplex 
Construction Pty 
Ltd [2001] SGDC 
332
Building and 
construction
$218,500   — Plaintiff claimed that Defendant 
owed it money.
 — Defendant claimed that Plaintiff 
owed it money.
 — Burden of proof of strong prima 
facie case of unconscionability not 
discharged.
28. 8 November 
2001
Liang Huat 
Aluminium 
Industries Pte 
Ltd v Hi-Tek 
Construction Pte 
Ltd [2001] SGHC 
334
Building and 
construction
$538,000   — Not possible to determine at 
interlocutory stage whether 
Defendant’s claims against Plaintiff 
are justifiable.
(continuted)
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29. 5 Dec 2001 Samwoh Asphalt 
Premix Pte Ltd  
v Sum Cheong 
Piling Private 
Limited and 
Another [2002] 1 
SLR 1
Building and 
construction
$500,000   — Ulterior motive for calling on the 
bond.
 — The Defendant wanted the 
Plaintiff to take over the main 
contract when they were only the 
nominated sub-contractor.
 — The call on the performance 
bond was a bargaining chip in the 
negotiations.
30. 17 January 
2000
Dauphin Offshore 
Engineering & 
Trading Pte Ltd  
v The Private Office 
of HRH Sheikh 
Sultan bin Khalifa 
bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan [2000] 1 
SLR(R) 117
Building of a 
yacht
$877,500   — No unconscionability because 
there were genuine disputes.
 — Some hesitation because Plaintiff 
has done substantial work but has 
not been paid.
31. 18 September 
2000
Eltraco 
International 
Pte Ltd v CGH 
Development 
Pte Ltd [2000] 3 
SLR(R) 198
Building and 
construction
$2,438,800 (partial 
restraint— 
only entitled 
to call on 
$600,000)
 — Damages not to the extent of the 
full bond value.
 — Contrasted with the English case 
of Cargill.
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Appendix B
Personal Information
1. Please state your number of years with Post Qualification Experience.
2. Please elaborate on your practice (eg, do you work in a local or international 
law firm, size of firm, area of practice).
3. Please elaborate on the profile of your clients (eg, owners, main contractors, 
sub-contractors, paid up capital etc).
Formation of Contract Stage
4. Are clients concerned about a potential restraint on performance bonds at 
the contract formation stage?
5. If clients are concerned about a potential restraint on performance at the 
contract formation stage:
a) Who is the person (eg, legal counsel, quantity surveyor, engineer etc) 
typically concerned about this?
b) Do clients factor this into the contract price?
c) Do clients choose a foreign law to govern the performance bond?
d) Do they seek to exclude unconscionability as a ground for restraint from 
the words of the performance bond?
6. If the answer to question 4 is no, please elaborate why your clients are not 
concerned.
Calls and Restraint on Performance Bonds
7. How often do you see calls on performance bonds which are tactical and 
abusive? Please elaborate on your answer as to what you consider to be tacti-
cal and abusive calls.
8. Do your clients often ask you to consider a restraint on a call on performance 
bond?
9. Is the law in Singapore clear enough for you to advise your client on restrain-
ing a call on a performance bond?
10. Please give a ballpark figure as to hearing days and costs for restraining a call 
on a performance bond?
11. How often do parties appeal a court’s decision to allow or deny a restrain a call 
on a performance bond? Do they appeal all the way to the Court of Appeal? 
Can you give a ballpark figure on the costs and hearing days involved?
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12. Do parties attempt to settle disputes on a restraint on a call on a performance 
bond? What are the impediments to settlement, if any?
13. In your personal opinion, is unconscionability as a separate ground for 
restraining performance bonds a positive or negative development? Please 
elaborate on your answer.
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